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Abstract 
Although the relationship between natural resources and civil war has received much attention, little is 
known about the underlying mechanisms. Controversies and contradictions in the stylized facts persist 
because resource extraction is treated as exogenous while in reality fighting affects extraction. We study 
endogenous fighting, armament, and extraction method, speed and investment. Rapacious resource 
exploitation has economic costs, but can nevertheless be preferred to balanced depletion due to lowered 
incentives for future rebel attacks. With private exploitation, rebels fight more than the government if 
they can renege on the contract with the mining company, and hence government turnover is larger in this 
case. Incentive-compatible license fees paid by private companies and mining investment are lower in 
unstable countries, and increase with the quality of the government army and office rents. This implies 
that privatised resource exploitation is more attractive for governments who have incentives to fight hard, 
i.e., in the presence of large office rents and a strong army. With endogenous weapon investments, the 
government invests more under balanced than under rapacious or private extraction. If the government 
can commit before mining licenses are auctioned, it will invest more in weapons under private extraction 
than under balanced and rapacious nationalized extraction. 
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1. Introduction 
Natural resource abundance and exploitation fuel political unrest if different factions in society try to get 
control of the resource rents. Put differently, natural resource wealth increases the potential gains of 
controlling political power. However, the causation between natural resources and conflict also goes the 
other way. Political instability may push governments to rapacious resource depletion, but can also reduce 
the incentive of especially private mining companies to explore and extract. Conflict thus influences 
economic decisions with respect to the method and intensity of natural resource extraction. So far the two 
directions of causality have been analyzed largely independently. While the literature on conflict and rent 
seeking has mostly treated natural resource extraction as exogenous and has focused on explaining 
appropriation efforts and outcomes (e.g., Torvik, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 2005; 
Mehlum et al., 2006), the literature on natural resource economics has investigated the impact of insecure 
property rights on extraction levels without taking into account the effects of natural resources on fighting 
decisions (e.g., Tornell and Lane, 1999; van der Ploeg, 2009).  
Our objective is to investigate the two-way interaction between natural resource extraction and conflict. 
We thus present a unified framework with both endogenous armament and fighting decisions and an 
endogenous choice of method and intensity of extraction. This enables us to derive predictions on the 
relative and absolute levels of fighting effort, the odds of victory, the method of and investment level in 
resource extraction, as well as the total amounts and payoffs from extraction received by the government 
and by international extraction companies. Our results can account for various empirical puzzles.  
There are relatively few theoretical papers linking natural resource exploitation and civil war. Most of the 
literature focuses on how larger natural resource stocks increase the incentives for rent-seeking and 
appropriation by increasing the “prize” to be appropriated (Torvik, 2002; Grossman and Mendoza, 2003; 
Maxwell and Reuveny, 2005; Hodler, 2006; Morelli and Rohner, 2009). 1 However, all of these articles 
treat resource extraction as exogenous. Another strand of the theoretical literature emphasizes how there 
can be over-extraction of natural resources in the presence of uncertainty about property rights (Hotte, 
2005; van der Ploeg, 2009) or about future political outcomes (Robinson et al., 2006). These 
contributions, however, do not relate to civil conflict.2
We build on these strands of the literature and construct what is to our best knowledge the first model that 
makes fully endogenous both the level of conflict and the mode and intensity of natural resource 
extraction. Our framework generates several surprising predictions and accounts for various empirical 
1 Fearon (2005) argues that natural resources can foster conflict by weakening state capacity. 
2 Rohner (2006) shows how resources affect fighting, but does not take into account the choice of extraction 
technologies, non-linear fighting technologies or asymmetries between government and rebels. 
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puzzles. In particular, we explain why in some instances in the presence of conflict over-exploitation (i.e., 
rapacious depletion) takes place while in other instances there is under-exploitation (i.e., under privatized 
exploitation investment is usually inefficiently low in the presence of conflict). Although rapacious 
depletion is less desirable from a purely economic standpoint than balanced resource exploitation, it can 
be preferable once conflict is taken into account, as fighting is higher under balanced depletion. 
Furthermore, we show why the government has better chances of victory under nationalized than 
privatized extraction. With private exploitation, rebels fight more than the government if they can renege 
on the contract with the mining company. As a result, rebels are better off under privatized than under 
nationalized exploitation. Our results can account for the trend towards nationalized oil companies despite 
strong empirical evidence that private international oil companies are on average substantially more 
efficient than national oil companies.3 The incentive-compatible license fee that has to be paid by the 
private mining company is higher if the army quality of the government, office rents and future resource 
revenues are higher. Effectively, there is a hold-up problem for private mining investment which is 
deterred by the threat of rebels gaining office. With endogenous investment in weapons, there is also a 
time inconsistency problem for the government, since the government invests more in weapons if it can 
commit in advance of mining licenses being auctioned. Without commitment there is more investment in 
weaponry under balanced than under rapacious or private resource extraction. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a critical survey of the existing 
empirical literature and puzzles. In section 3 we build the basic model of conflict and resource extraction, 
whereas in section 4 this framework is extended to allow for endogenous private mining investment. In 
section 5 government investment in weapons is made endogenous under the various scenarios. Section 6 
studies what happens when the government bribes rebels by offering them work. Section 7 briefly 
discusses cash constraints, contracts and capital-intensive mining. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Stylized empirical facts 
We first discuss the findings and critically assess the shortcomings of the existing empirical literature on 
the impact of natural resources on the onset of civil wars, before arguing what our framework has to offer 
to future empirical research in this area. Then we briefly discuss the literature studying the effects of 
conflict on resource extraction and present some new stylized facts.  
3 There is substantial empirical evidence that international oil companies are more efficient on a variety of indicators 
and yield higher returns than nationalized oil companies (Al-Obaidan and Scully, 1991; Victor, 2007; Eller et al., 
2007; Wolf, 2009). 
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Table 1: Overview of existing empirical evidence on the impact of natural resources on civil wars 
Resource measure used Main findings 
Control extract. 
endog. to fight
Onsets and Incidence
De Soysa (2002), 
Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), Fearon (2005)
Oil exporter dummy, fuel 
exports / total exports
Both measures increase war 
onsets No
Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004), Collier et al. 
(2009) Primary exports / GDP
Increases war onsets (inverted U-
shape) No
Fearon (2005), 
Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte (2009) 
Primary exports / GDP 
(with further robustness 
checks and instrumented) 
The effect of primary exports on 
war onsets seems not very robust No
Lujala et al. (2005), 
Lujala (2010)
Diamond deposit, diamond 
production, and oil 
production dummies
Secondary diamonds increase 
onset and incidence (ethnic) war, 
primary diamonds decrease 
incidence war, (onshore) oil 
increases onsets No
Humphreys (2005)
Oil production, oil reserves, 
diamond production
Both oil production and diamond 
production increase war onsets No
Ross (2006)
Fuel rents and diamond 
rents per capita
Fuel onshore and offshore and 
primary diamonds increase war 
onsets, secondary diamonds 
increase onsets separatist wars No
Fearon (2004), Ross 
(2006)
Contraband (cocaine, 
gems, opium etc) dummy Increases war duration No
Collier et al. (2004) Primary exports / GDP
Level not significant. Lower price 
of commodities exported shortens 
war No
Lujala (2009)
Gem, drug and 
hydrocarbon production 
dummies
The presence of these measures 
in conflict zone increases combat 
deaths No
Lujala (2010)
Gemstones, oil reserves 
and production dummies
The presence of these measures 
in conflict zone increases 
duration war No
Duration and fatalities
 
 
2.1. The impact of natural resources on civil wars: empirical results 
Table 1 summarizes the findings of the existing empirical literature on the impact of natural resources on 
the onset of civil war, pioneered by Collier and Hoeffler (2004)4, who found that an intermediate (rather 
than a small or large) ratio of primary commodity exports over GDP increases the risk of civil war. It is 
                                                           
4 Recently, this was extended with more recent data and additional independent variables (Collier et al., 2009). 
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controversial how robust this finding is (cf. Fearon, 2005). What, however, is widely accepted is that 
some natural resources are more conducive to war than others. In particular, diamonds (Lujala et al., 
2005; Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2006; Lujala, 2010), oil (De Soysa, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Ross, 
2004, 2006; Fearon, 2005; Humphreys, 2005) and narcotics (Angrist and Kugler, 2008; Lujala, 2009) 
increase the risk of civil conflict onsets. Further, lootable resources like alluvial gemstones, narcotics and 
timber also tend to sustain and prolong war effort during conflict (Fearon, 2004; Ross, 2004, 2006; 
Lujala, 2010). Trade and commodity price shocks have also been found to lead to conflict in some 
instances (Ross, 2006; Dube and Vargas, 2008; Besley and Persson, 2009; Brückner and Ciccone, 2010).  
 
2.2. Measurement problems and endogenity 
One important controversy in this empirical literature has been the issue of how to measure natural 
resource abundance. The first generation of papers focused on measures of resource wealth as expressed 
in terms of GDP or of total exports. Collier and Hoeffler (2004), for example, use primary exports / GDP 
as explanatory variable, while De Soysa (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Fearon (2005) focus on 
limited or continuous independent variables that relate oil exports to total exports. As has been pointed 
out, for example, by Ross (2006) or Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) these measures suffer from 
endogeneity bias. If conflict onsets are preceded by low-level political instability and this unrest is most 
harmful to complex industrial sectors, the structure of the economy can change and a country can become 
more resource dependent. Thus, reversed causality is a real concern, as a positive correlation between 
natural resources and civil war is not only consistent with resources fuelling war, but also with civil war 
making a country more resource dependent. To counter this criticism, most recent studies use resource 
measures that are independent of GDP or of total exports. Fearon (2004), Lujala et al. (2005), and Lujala 
(2009, 2010) use dummy variables for diamond, gems, oil deposits and production and narcotics 
production, while Humphreys (2005) and Ross (2006) use measures of the total value or rents from fuel 
and diamond production or reserves. These measures are, however, also not fully satisfactory, because the 
absolute value of resource rents may also be related to the size of the non-resource economy. Extracting a 
given small amount of oil or gas has a different meaning for a poor country as Sudan than for a rich 
country as Switzerland.  
One important shortcoming that all of these studies share is that none of them takes into account that both 
the quantities of natural resources extracted and their profitability is endogenous with respect to the 
fighting efforts of the various war factions. Natural resource extraction may be more intensive if the 
government needs to fund a big army and purchase better weapons to fight off rebel coups. Governments 
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may also join forces with multinationals who offer them more efficient modes of natural resource 
extraction. Furthermore, if mining companies pay a license fee upfront, this provides the funds to stage a 
better military force. During periods of peace the government is less likely to invest in defense. The 
theory we put forward attempts, for the first time, to give a simultaneous explanation of both the intensity 
of war and the intensity of natural resource extraction. Empirical estimates that treat natural resource 
extraction as exogenous and impose a linear relationship between resources and conflict could suffer from 
biased coefficients and misguiding significance levels that may lead to wrong conclusions.  
 
2.3. The impact of political instability on natural resource extraction 
There is also a small empirical literature on how political instability affects resource extraction. The 
results indicate that the presence of conflict leads to distortions; both over- and under-exploitation are 
observed in reality. According to Deacon (1999) and Bohn and Deacon (2000), insecure property rights 
lead to excessive deforestation. In contrast, for other natural resources that need more investment and a 
more sophisticated extraction technology (e.g., minerals), ownership risk can result in inefficiently low 
investment and extraction. Bohn and Deacon (2000) find that oil drilling is reduced in more risky 
countries. Deacon and Mueller (2006: 136) summarize the findings of this empirical literature as follows: 
“In simple situations, insecure tenure for resource stocks leads to premature and excessive depletion. 
When resource extraction is capital intensive, however, insecure ownership can raise extraction costs and 
diminish or eliminate the incentive to deplete resource stock.”  This empirical literature takes political 
instability and property rights protection as exogenous. Our model suggests, however, that ignoring the 
bi-directional causality links between natural resources and conflict can bias estimates. 
 
2.4. Other stylized facts 
We also offer some stylized suggestive correlations, which are in line with the predictions of our theory. 
For a description of the data, see the appendix.  These stylized facts reflect correlation rather than 
causality, and are simply meant to motivate part of our analytical results. Figure 1 suggests a positive 
correlation between the license fee paid by foreign mining companies to the host government and military 
expenditures as percentage of GDP.5 This is consistent with the idea that countries with more secure 
regimes can extract greater license fees from foreign mining companies. 
5 Some extreme outliers have been removed in figures 1 and 2, but the correlation coefficients are based on the 
sample including outliers. Without outliers they would be slightly higher. 
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Figure 1: Licence fees and military expenditures 
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The two panels of figure 2 indicate a positive correlation between oil production or oil reserves and 
military expenditures. This is in line with our prediction that resource-rich countries have greater 
incentives to build a large army. 
Figure 2: Oil production, oil reserves and military expenditures 
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We also find in the data that military expenditures seem to be higher in non-democratic and corrupt 
countries, which is in line with our analysis. Finally, figure 3 suggests that governments tend to have 
better chances of staying in office for longer when a country produces oil, and a fortiori when the 
petroleum resources are extracted by a nationalized company (cf., Smith, 2004, who finds that oil 
increases regime duration, but does not distinguish between private and public oil extraction). 
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Figure 3: Regime duration and oil extraction 
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3. Modelling Resource Conflict and Private versus Public Resource Exploitation 
We consider a two-period, resource-rich economy with a government G whose term of office at the end of 
the first period is contested by rebels R.6 We assume, for simplicity, that both the rate of interest and the 
time preference of the government equal zero. If the government exploits the natural resources itself, it 
can either extract them quickly leading to revenue NG − ρ  in period 1 and zero in period 2 or can extract 
them in a balanced manner leading to revenue NG/2 each period. Balanced exploitation would be optimal 
under the Hotelling rule if extraction costs are zero (and the interest rate is zero). Quick depletion is 
inefficient from the Hotelling point of view and thus yields ρ > 0 less natural resource revenues in total.  
Instead of nationalized resource exploitation, the government can also delegate this to a more efficient 
private company M. This private mining company invests I in the first period in order to obtain natural 
resource revenues NP in period two. For this privilege, it has to pay the government a license fee L. The 
private sector is assumed to be competitive. We further assume that NP − I > NG > NG − ρ holds, i.e., that 
private extraction is more efficient than balanced nationalized extraction and a fortiori than rapacious 
nationalized extraction. One way of interpreting this setup is that the government has access to alluvial 
                                                           
6 We abstract from multiple rebel factions. We also abstract from the possibility of repression where war is 
prevented by deterring rebels with government armies. This would yield no war for low, repression for intermediate, 
and war for high values of natural resource revenues, and requires a degree of representative or consensual political 
institutions – proxied by having to also pay something to rival groups whenever transfers are made to the own group 
– as well as asymmetry in the effects of the armed forces being raised on the re-election probability (Besley and 
Persson, 2009). If political institutions are to some extent consensual, we find that the nationalized outcome with 
rapacious depletion is unaffected but the one with balanced depletion leads to less fighting of both factions. 
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natural resource deposits without having to invest in advanced mining technology whereas the private 
mining company has the knowledge and financial resources at its disposal to invest in exploitation 
technology to reach less easily accessible natural resource deposits. We treat the investment level I of the 
private mining company as given, but section 4 shows that our results carry over if I is endogenous. 
The probability p of the government holding on to office and not being removed by the rebels increases 
with the fighting effort by the government group fG and the quality of its army α  but decreases with the 
fighting effort by the rebels fR. More precisely, we have the familiar ratio-form contest success function p 
= αfG/(αfG + fR). The quality of the rebel army is normalized to one, but the government can use some of 
the resource revenues or license fee to buy weapons at a cost C(α), C(1)=0, C′>0, C″≥0 to boost the 
quality of its army to α > 1. Note that roman capital letters followed by parentheses designate functions. 
In this section we take levels of α and C(α) as given. We discuss optimal investment in weapon stocks 
under various non-cooperative outcomes in section 5, which does not affect the results of this section.   
Total time available to both the government and rebel factions for either work or fighting is normalized to 
unity. The time that the government and rebel groups do not fight (i.e., 1−fG and 1−fR, respectively), they 
work and earn an exogenous wage W. For simplicity, we do not include wage W for period two, as this 
would be the same for all outcomes and therefore plays no role in the analysis. We could also allow for a 
psychic and casualty cost of war (e.g., fGD and fRD, respectively), but analytically this is equivalent to 
increasing the wage with this cost of war (i.e., using W+D rather than W as the wage)7. The group in 
power gets office rents B in each period (e.g., from bribes, status, ego). One can think of B being larger in 
countries that are autocratic and/or have high corruption levels. We assume that both governments and 
rebels are risk neutral, but it is straightforward to allow for risk aversion. In the following, we indicate the 
non-cooperative outcomes with conflict under rapacious nationalized extraction, balanced (Hotelling) 
national extraction and private exploitation by the superscripts Q, H and P, respectively. The cooperative 
outcome with peace will, in addition, be denoted by the superscript C. 
 
3.1. Benchmark: Peace and the cooperative outcome 
The cooperative outcome avoids war, so has no fighting about office rents or resource revenues. Hence, 
the government does not invest in weapons, 1α = . Further, 0i iG Rf f= = , , ,i CQ CH CP= . As a result, 
                                                           
7 We abstract from the possibility that conflict adversely affects health and productivity of workers, destroys 
infrastructure, and thus lowers the wage (i.e., we ignore that W may depend negatively on fG+fR). 
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.
.
the payoff to rebels before compensation always equals the wage,  The 
competitive license fee under privatized extraction will equal expected resource revenues minus the 
necessary investment outlay, L = N
, , ,iR W i CQ CH CPΠ = =
P − I. Due to the inefficiency losses of too quick depletion (i.e., ρ > 0), 
it never pays for the government to deplete resources rapaciously under nationalized exploitation. The 
government would thus follow the Hotelling rule. However, private exploitation is more efficient than 
nationalized extraction and is thus preferred to balanced and a fortiori to rapacious nationalized 
extraction. We thus have the following ranking of government payoffs under the peace outcome: 
(1)    2 2 2C CP CH CQG G P G G G GB W N I B W N B W N ρΠ = Π = + + − > Π = + + > Π = + + −  
Hence, privatized extraction is the preferred mode under cooperation. We will thus denote the preferred 
cooperative outcome with the superscript C instead of CP. Since there is no fighting, the cooperative 
outcome can only be sustained if the rebels receive side payments from the government (and implicitly 
from the private mining company). The magnitude of these side payments can be determined from the 
Nash bargaining solution, where the outcome depends on the fallback positions for both the government 
and the rebels. This cooperative outcome is only feasible if the government credibly commits to pay the 
transfers and rebels credibly commit to renounce violence. Below we shall discuss situations where 
credible commitment is not possible and non-cooperative outcomes occur. 
 
3.2. Fighting under balanced nationalized exploitation 
Payoffs to the government and rebel factions are, respectively, given by 
(2)  
C( ) (1 )   and
2 2
              (1 ) ,
2
H
H HG G G
G GH H
G R
H
H HGR
R RH H
G R
N f NB B
f f
Nf B f W
f f
αα α
α
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞Π = + − + + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞Π = + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
f W
 
where superscript H denotes balanced (Hotelling) extraction. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is8
(3)    2 / .(1 ) 2
H H G
G R
Nf f Bαα
⎛ ⎞= = +⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠ W
                                                           
 
8 We suppose groups perfectly monitor each others’ military strength. In a classic dynamic guns-versus-butter 
dilemma, not being able to monitor each others’ military strength leads to a bigger build-up of armaments and lower 
social welfare (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1990).   
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Hence, government and rebels fight more if office rents B are high, resource revenues in the second 
period are high and return on work W is low. Both government and rebels are deterred from fighting if the 
government has access to superior weapons ( 2/ (1 ) /α α α∂ + ∂ =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ 3( 1) / (1 ) 0α α − − + <  provided α  > 1). 
This is a general result for these standard ratio-form contest success functions: higher asymmetry between 
fighting technologies of the conflict parties decreases total fighting efforts in equilibrium. 
 
3.3. Fighting under rapacious nationalized exploitation 
Under rapacious nationalized exploitation the government exploits its natural resources all in one go, 
which is inefficient from the Hotelling point of view but has the advantage that the rebels cannot 
appropriate the natural resources. The payoffs to the government and rebel factions are thus given by 
(2′)         
C( ) (1 )   and
              (1 ) ,
Q
Q QG
G G GQ Q
G R
Q
Q QR
R RQ Q
G R
fB N B f W
f f
f B f W
f f
αρ α α
α
⎛ ⎞Π = + − − + + −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞Π = + −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 
respectively, where superscript Q denotes the outcome under rapacious nationalized extraction. The non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium in fighting efforts under quick depletion yields the symmetric outcome 
(3′)          2 .(1 )
Q Q H H
G R G R
Bf f f
W
α
α
⎛ ⎞= = < =⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠ f  
Under quick depletion there is less fighting by both government and rebels, since each of them is only 
concerned with office rents as there are no resource revenues in the second period.  
Proposition 1: Government and rebels fight more vigorously if office rents are high, anticipated resource 
revenues are high and the return on working is low. Both are deterred from fighting if the government has 
access to superior weapons. Fighting intensity is largest if fighting strengths are symmetric. With 
rapacious extraction both government and rebels fight less intensively than with balanced extraction. 
Proof: Follows from equations (3) and (3′).  
Intuitively, rapacious depletion is less bellicose since factions are only concerned with office rents as 
there are no natural resource revenues left in the future. Hence, balanced extraction is efficient from a 
Hotelling point of view, but not from a political point of view as it induces more fighting and less 
productive activities. Proposition 1 is supported by empirical evidence showing that countries which are 
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more corrupt and less democratic (i.e., with high B) and poor (i.e., low W) experience higher fighting 
efforts and are more likely to experience civil war (e.g., Reynal-Querol, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Cederman and Girardin, 2007; Collier and Rohner, 2008; Collier et al., 2009).   
 
3.4. Fighting and incentive compatible license fee under private exploitation 
We suppose that if the government concludes a contract with the mining company, this contract is binding 
and enforceable. However, if the government is removed from office, the rebels do not feel bound to the 
contract. Hence, they grab all natural resource revenue and the mining company receives nothing.9 It 
follows that the payoffs to the government and rebels are 
(2″)   
( )
C( ) (1 )   and
        (1 ) ,
P
P PG
G GP P
G R
P
P PR
R P RP P
G R
fB L B f W
f f
f B N f W
f f
αα α
α
⎛ ⎞Π = + − + + −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞Π = + + −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 
respectively, where superscript P refers to the private extraction. The government maximizes its payoff 
under the incentive compatibility constraint of the mining company, which says that expected natural 
resource revenues must at least cover the initial investment outlay plus the license fee: 
(4)           .
P
G
PP P
G R
f N I L
f f
α
α
⎛ ⎞ ≥ +⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 
Given our assumption of perfect competition among mining companies, the above incentive compatibility 
constraint holds with equality.10 The resulting non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in fighting efforts is 
given by the asymmetric outcome: 
(3″)             
2
2 2
( ) .
[(1 ) ] [(1 ) ]
P PP P
G R
P P
B N B B N B NBf f
B N W B N W
αα
α α
+ +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= < =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ + + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
P+
                                                           
 
9 An alternative is that Nash bargaining takes place between the rebels and the mining company. Our main 
qualitative insights also hold for this alternative assumption. 
10 Licenses can be allocated via a competitive auction. In general, a balance must be struck between efficient 
allocation of oil rights and high revenues for the government. A simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may 
suffice when competition is weak and values are additive; with more complex value structures dynamic auctions 
with package bids such as the clock-proxy auction are preferable (Cramton, 2007). 
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The rebels fight more and work less than the government faction, since they do not feel bound by the 
contract with the mining company and aim to grab all resource revenues in the second period. Hence, the 
chances of the government staying in office, p, are lower under private than nationalized extraction:  
(5)      .
(1 ) 1
P H
P
Bp p p
B N
Qα α
α α= < = =+ + +  
Furthermore, higher projected resource revenues induces rebels to fight more ( / 0PR Pf N∂ ∂ > ) but  
the government to fight less (  if / 0PG Pf N∂ ∂ < ( 1)PN Bα> −  which holds if α = 1). The government 
faction thus fights less while rebels fight more under private than under nationalized extraction. In 
equilibrium the mining company pays the following license fee: 
(6)      .
(1 ) PP
BL N
B N
α
α
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦
I  
The license fee is higher if the weapon technology of the government is better (higher α), since then the 
property rights of the government and thus of the mining company are better protected. Further, the 
license fee increases in office rents B and expected future resource revenues PN
11 and is reduced by the 
necessary exploitation investment outlays.  
Proposition 2: With extraction delegated to a private mining company, the rebels fight more and work 
less than the government. Accordingly, chances of the government retaining office are lower under 
private than nationalized extraction. The mining company pays a higher license fee if the government has 
superior weapons and office rents are large. 
Proof: Follows from equations (3″), (5) and (6).   
The rebels fight harder as they are not bound by the contract with the mining company and aim to grab all 
future resource revenues. This makes them more likely to gain office. All factors that favour the military 
prospects of the government (i.e., powerful weapons and large office rents) result in better property rights 
protection and lead to a higher licence fee. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that international oil companies tend to offer “bad” exploitation deals to 
politically instable countries, and that at least in some instances these companies have engaged in direct 
                                                           
Pα
0.
11 This follows from . Note 
that  
[ ]22 22/ / 0, / (1 ) / (1 ) 0[(1 ) ]P PPL B N L N B B NB Nα α αα∂ ∂ = > ∂ ∂ = + + + >+ +
2 2 2 2/ 0 and / PL B L N∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ <
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military support of the government, for example by furnishing military equipment and weaponry (cf., the 
cases of oil companies in Colombia, of Total in Burma or of Elf in Chad, Republic of Congo and Angola) 
(Swanson, 2002; Humphreys, 2005). Our predictions are also backed up by systematic evidence from 
firm-level data indicating that governments in countries with higher democratic accountability, lower 
political risk and higher bureaucratic ability receive a larger share of natural resource rents while 
multinationals receive less (McMillan and Waxman, 2007). 
 
3.5 Comparing the payoffs under nationalized and privatized extraction 
For nationalized extraction, the substitution of fighting efforts (3) and (3′) into, respectively, payoff 
functions (2) and (2′) yields the following non-cooperative Nash equilibrium payoffs for the government:  
(7)           
2
2C( )2 (1 )
H G G
G
N NB W Bαα α
⎛ ⎞Π = + − + + +⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠2  
(7′)             
2
2C( ) (1 )
Q
G GB N W
αρ α αΠ = + − − + + + B . 
The government prefers balanced to rapacious exploitation if and only if the efficiency loss ρ  of 
rapacious extraction is above the threshold * 2
1 2
2(1 ) G
Nαρ α
+≡ + . The relative attractiveness of rapacious 
exploitation thus increases in the total resource rents  and decreases in the government’s fighting 
strength 
GN
α and the efficiency cost of rapacious resource depletion ρ. Further, note that rebels always 
prefer the government to postpone depletion in a balanced Hotelling manner as this offers them more 
scope to appropriate natural resource revenues. 
Substituting (3″) and (6) into (2″) yields the government payoff under private resource extraction: 
(7″)     2
( )(C( )
[(1 ) ]
P )P P
G
P
B B N B NB I W
B N
α αα α
+ +Π = − − + + + + . 
The government prefers private extraction if the following condition holds: 
(8)  [ ]
2 2
2 2 2
( )( ) Max ,
(1 ) 2 (1 ) 2(1 )
G GP P
G
P
N NB B N B N I N B B
B N
α α α αρ α αα
⎧ ⎫+ + ⎛ ⎞− > − + + +⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟+ + ⎝ ⎠+ + ⎩ ⎭
. 
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This is the case if NG and I are relatively small and ρ  is large. Further, private extraction is preferred by 
the government if its weapon strength α  is very large and office rents B are large.12 In contrast, the 
government prefers balanced nationalized extraction if *ρ ρ>  and the following condition holds: 
(9)             
2
2 2
( )( )
[(1 ) ] 2 (1 ) 2
G GP P
P
N NB B N B N I B
B N
α α α
α α
+ + ⎛ ⎞− < + +⎜ ⎟+ + + ⎝ ⎠ . 
Rapacious nationalized extraction is preferred if *ρ ρ<  and the following condition holds: 
(10)          
2
2 2
( )( )
[(1 ) ] (1 )
P P
G
P
B B N B N I N B
B N
α α αρα α
+ + − < − ++ + + . 
 
 
Figure 4: Extraction regimes 
(a) Efficiency of privatized extraction NP and cost of rapacious depletion ρ 
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12 As α →∞ equation (8) becomes { }Max ,P G GB N I N B N Bρ+ − > − + + , which always holds. We also 
have 
2
2 2
( )( ) / 0
[(1 ) ] (1 )
P P
P
B B N B N B B
B N
α α α
α α
⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠
∂ − ∂ > . 
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(b) Weapon technology of government α and cost of rapacious depletion ρ 
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(c) Office rents B and cost of rapacious depletion ρ 
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The various regimes are displayed graphically in figure 4 for various parameter combinations13. Panel (a) 
does this for combinations of ρ  and NP. Privatized extraction dominates for high returns to privatized 
production NP and large efficiency losses of rapacious depletion ρ . Rapacious depletion is selected for 
low levels of NP and ρ , while Hotelling extraction is chosen for low NP and high ρ .  
Panel (b) displays the same three zones for the same parameter values (and now NP=2), but this time in 
the space ρ  and α . Privatized exploitation takes place for high levels of α , while we predict rapacious 
extraction for low α  and low ρ . For low α  and high ρ  balanced depletion takes place. Finally, panel 
(c) indicates that privatized dominates nationalized extraction for high values of B. 
Proposition 3: If credible commitment and side payments are feasible, cooperation sustains peace with 
extraction delegated to a more efficient private mining company and rebels receiving a share of natural 
resource rents. Without credible commitment, fighting occurs. The government then prefers rapacious to 
balanced depletion if the efficiency cost of rapacious depletion ρ  is small. Privatized exploitation is the 
preferred option of the government if natural resource rents NG and investment cost I are small relative to 
NP and the efficiency loss of rapacious depletion ρ  is large, the government can rely on a powerful army 
(high α ), and office rents B are large. 
Proof: Follows from equations (1), (8) and the condition *ρ ρ> . 
This first part of this proposition relating to the cooperative outcome is in line with the empirical evidence 
that shows that the resource curse can be turned into a blessing in countries with good institutions 
(Mehlum et al., 2006). Indeed, social tensions and distributive conflict are less salient if consensual 
political institutions and power-sharing are in place (Reynal-Querol, 2002; Cederman and Girardin, 
2007). There is also empirical evidence which suggests that democracies opt less frequently for 
(nationalized) rapacious depletion (Li and Reuveny, 2006) and that nationalization of oil companies is 
more likely to occur if the quality of institutions is low (Guriev, et al., 2009). 
The rest of proposition 3 focuses on situations where the cooperative outcome does not occur. In this 
case, higher office rents make it more likely that a government selects more efficient privatized resource 
extraction, so we expect office rents and natural resource output to be positively correlated. Since 
corruption increases the office rents of being in power, this corroborates evidence that suggests that 
natural resources production is associated with more corruption (Isham et al., 2005). More precisely, 
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009) find that the positive correlation between oil and corruption only holds 
for undemocratic countries (i.e., when it is harder to achieve the cooperative outcome in our setting). 
                                                           
13 For figure 4 we have used the parameter values B=1, NG=0.5, α =1, and I=0. 
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However, while the prevailing literature focuses on natural resources destroying good governance in 
rentier states, we argue that there also exists another channel with the opposite direction of causality. 
Undemocratic and corrupt regimes find it easier to commit to putting down rebels as the stakes of keeping 
office are very high. This commitment to high levels of government fighting leads to a better protection of 
property rights for private companies, which encourages investment and extraction.  
 
4. Endogenous Private Mining Investments 
Now consider endogenous private mining investments. The mining company invests I in the first period 
to obtain natural resource revenues ( ) N ,  N' 0,  N'' 0PN I= > ≤  in the second period by extracting 
more than only alluvial natural resource deposits. The timing is such that the government first sets the 
license fee and the mining company then selects the investment level. We proceed by backward 
induction. The mining company decides on its optimal exploitation investment after the cost of the license 
fee has been sunk. Given the license fee and fighting efforts of government and rebel armies, the mining 
company thus maximizes profits N( )
P
P G
M P P
G R
f I I L
f f
α
α
⎛ ⎞Π = − −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
where the subscript M refers to the 
mining company. This implies that the expected marginal revenue from natural resources must equal the 
marginal cost of exploitation investment: 
(11)        N '( ) 1 I /  and N* / ,
P
P P P PG
G R P G RP P
G R
f I I f f N f
f f
α α αα
+ +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⇒ = =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
f  
where { }I ' N' / ( / ) 1 / N" 0 and N*' N 'I ' 0P P P PG R G Rf f f fα α⎡ ⎤= − + > = >⎣ ⎦ follows from total 
differentiation of the first part of (11). Hence, if the government makes a relatively large fighting effort 
(large ratio /PG R
Pf f ) and has a superior weapon technology (high α), the property rights on natural 
resource rents are better protected and the mining company’s natural resources are less likely to be 
appropriated by the rebels. As a result, the mining company invests more and is thus able to extract more 
natural resources. The relative fighting efforts (3″) are used to rewrite (11) and to solve simultaneously 
for equilibrium mining investment and resource output:  
(11′)        * *I  and N I ,   and  N , .P P
P P
B BI N I B N
B N B N
α α ** Bα α+ + + +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= = ⇒ = =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ + ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
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Higher office rents and a higher quality of the government army make it more likely that the government 
will stay in power, so that the contract with the mining company will not be revoked by the rebels. 
Consequently, exploitation investment and natural resource output will be higher. Armed with (11′), we 
can use (6) to obtain the incentive-compatible license fee that is paid by the mining company:14  
(6′)         / /** *** N ( , ) I ( , ) L( , ).(1 ) N ( , )
BL B B
B B
α Bα α αα α
+ − + −⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦ ≡
                                                           
 
Equation (6′) captures (net) expected resource revenues received by the government.  On the one hand, 
license revenues are higher if the quality of government weapons α and office rents B are higher on 
account of the higher probability of the government holding on to office15 and the higher level of mining 
investment and consequent higher level of natural resource revenues. On the other hand, these effects are 
offset somewhat by higher exploitation investments which are also higher if office rents are higher and 
the government army is better. 
Proposition 4: Mining investments and resulting natural resource production are greater if property rights 
are better protected, which occurs if the government enjoys substantial office rents and has superior 
weapons. In that case, the government is likely to have a bigger chance of holding on to office. This 
together with the higher level of resource revenues boosts the license fee paid by the mining company. 
These effects are offset somewhat by the higher cost of mining investment. 
Proof: Follows from equations (11′) and (6′). 
This is in line with empirical evidence indicating that in politically unstable countries the levels of 
resource depletion is often suboptimal (Bohn and Deacon, 2000).  
 
5. Government Investment in Weapons 
What happens if government investment in weapons α  is made endogenous? Assume for the time being 
that α P is chosen simultaneously with fighting efforts but before mining licenses are auctioned and that 
B14 Total differentiation of (6′) yields  {
** 2 2 *2d (1 ) N (1 ) d I d{[ ]B P P BL B N B N Bα α α −
−+
= + + + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦144444424444443
{
** 2 *(1 ) N ( ) (1 ) d I d ,[ ]P P PB B N B N B Nα αα α α −
−+
+ + + + + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦1444444442444444443 α α which gives the partial derivatives of L(.). 
15 Note that from (5) and (11′), we have ***/ [(1 ) N ( , )] ( , ).Pp B B B p Bα α α
+ +
= + + ≡ α
0
 Also, note that  and 
, as long as  and 
/ 0Pp B∂ ∂ >
/Pp α∂ ∂ > **N
B
**
Nα  are not too large. 
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rebels do not invest in weapons and simply fight by fielding soldiers. The investment in weaponry that 
maximizes the government payoff under each outcome is set so that the marginal cost of weapons equals 
the marginal change in the probability of staying in office times the stake of staying in office:16
(12)       
1C '( ) , C '( ) and C'( ) ( ),
2
H Q
H Q P
GH Q
p p P
P
pB N Bα α αα α
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂⎛ ⎞= + = =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
B Lα
∂ +∂
, .P
 
where  Notice that the stake of staying in office 
corresponds to the office rents plus the revenue from oil extraction. A Nash equilibrium in fighting efforts 
yields (3), (3′) and (3″) for each of the regimes, respectively, which can be used to obtain: 
2/ / ( ) 0, ,i i i i i i iG R G Rp f f f f i H Qα α∂ ∂ = + > =
(12′) 22 21C '( )(1 ) , C '( )(1 )  and C '( )(1 )
2
.H H Q Q P PG PB N B B Nα α α α α α+ = + + = + = +  
The third expression of (12′) gives investment in weapons in the private extraction outcome with pre-
commitment as an increasing function of natural resource revenues as a fraction of office rents and an 
increasing function of office rents themselves; hence, (P P ).B Nα
+= Α +  Together with the first two 
expressions of (12′), this gives the following ranking: 
(12″)           ( ) ( / 2) (P H QP G ).B N B Nα α α
+ += Α + > = Α + > = Α B+
                                                           
 
We thus see that the government invests more in weaponry under balanced than under rapacious 
depletion, since the stake to be fought over is larger as it includes future resource revenues as well as 
office rents. As a result, its grip on office is stronger. We also see that investment in weaponry under 
private extraction is larger than under balanced (and a fortiori rapacious) nationalized extraction. The 
reason is that government realizes that its probability of re-election is an increasing function of resource 
revenues as well as investment in weaponry. Note that investment in weapons is generally higher if fewer 
soldiers are being fielded by the incumbent and the rebel army is larger.17 It follows that it is attractive for 
the government to invest more in weapons.  
3)
16 This third first-order condition assumes that investment in weapons takes place before mining licenses are 
auctioned and that the investment in weapons does not change the optimality of the private extraction regime.  
17 Note 2 / ( ) / (R R G G RGp f f f f f fα α α∂ ∂ ∂ = − + being negative (positive) depending on whether fR is less than 
(or exceeds) α fG. Similarly,  if 2 / 0Rp fα∂ ∂ ∂ > G Rf fα > . In the symmetric case, we have 2 / 0Gp fα∂ ∂ ∂ <  and 
 provided that α > 1. 2 / 0Rp fα∂ ∂ ∂ >
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Consider now the situation that the government cannot pre-commit to promises to invest in weaponry or 
to deliver these investments before licenses are auctioned in the private extraction outcome. With this 
perhaps more realistic timing assumption, the license fee is a bygone at the moment decisions are made 
about fighting efforts and weapon investments so that the stake is B and not B + L. The factions thus solve 
the game backwards. The resulting first-order condition is the same as under rapacious nationalized 
depletion, so that investment in weaponry in the no-commitment case is given by ( ).BΑ  We thus establish 
immediately that the government invests less in weaponry if it cannot commit itself to investing in 
weaponry and thus to safeguarding property rights on natural resources. Not being able to commit, thus 
means that the government obtains a lower license fee than if it can commit. The incumbent thus faces a 
problem of time inconsistency: it wants to convince the mining company that it will invest a lot in 
weapons to stave off rebellion and make mining attractive, but once the license fee has been received it 
has an incentive to renege. Hence, without commitment, investment in weaponry is too low and both the 
government and the mining company are worse off as a result.  
Proposition 5: Without government commitment to weapon investments, investment in weaponry is 
higher under balanced extraction than under rapacious or private extraction and consequently the 
government grip on office is stronger. If commitment is feasible, the time inconsistency problem can be 
overcome so that the government invests more in weapons under private extraction and thus increases its 
chances of holding on to office and boosts the license fee it obtains from the mining company. The 
government then invests more in weaponry than under balanced and a fortiori under rapacious 
nationalized extraction. 
Proof: Follows from (12″) and the result that in the case of private extraction without commitment 
investment in weaponry is given by A(B). 
Empirically, oil increases the risk of conflict in non-corrupt countries, but in corrupt countries it has a less 
detrimental effect on stability (Fjelde, 2009). This and the positive relation between corruption and 
military spending found by Gupta et al. (2001) are consistent with our mechanism that high office rents 
can induce large army investments by the government, which reduce the effects of resources on conflict. 
 
6. Bribing rebels 
One possibility for the government to avoid rebel coups is to offer rebels attractive jobs. For example, if 
the government offers a wage subsidy Si to rebels only, the government payoff is reduced by (1 )i iRf S−  
and rebel wages are increased by the same amount. Assuming exogenous natural resource revenues, it 
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, ,follows that in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium / / ( ) 1,i i iR Gf f W W S i H Q= + < =  and thus that 
fighting efforts under balanced depletion are given by 
(13)    2 2
( ) 1 1   if  0
( ( )) 2 ( ( )) 2
H
H H
G G RH H
S W Wf B N f B N
W S W W S W
α α
α α
+ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + > = +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ + + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
H
G S >  
and under rapacious depletion are given by 
(13′)           2 2
( )   if  0.
( ( )) ( ( ))
Q
Q Q
G RQ Q
S W Wf B f B
W S W W S W
α α
α α
+= > =+ + + +
QS >   
Hence, rebels now fight in both outcomes less than the government if bribes incite them to work rather 
than fight. Note that equations (13) and (13′) reduce to (3) and (3′) if there is no bribe. The qualitative 
insight of proposition 1, i.e., for a given bribe fighting is less under rapacious than under balanced 
depletion, is unchanged. Differentiating both sides of (13) and (13′) with respect to the wage subsidy, we 
establish that a wage subsidy reduces fighting by both the government and by rebels 
( / 0, / 0, ,i i i iG Rf S f S i H∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ < = Q ), but the rebels’ fighting effort declines relatively more. The 
probability of the government staying in office under both balanced and rapacious depletion is higher if 
the government introduces a wage subsidy for rebels: 
(14)              
( )
( )
i
i
i
S Wp
W S W
α
α
+= + +   with  2/ 0( ( ))
i i
H
W , , .p S i
W S W
H Qαα∂ ∂ = > =+ +  
The optimal wage subsidy for rebels sets the marginal benefit arising from a higher probability of staying 
in office ( /i ip S∂ ∂  times the stake of B under rapacious depletion, respectively B + NG /2 under balanced 
depletion) equal to number of existing rebels plus the additional rebels who put down their arms that have 
to be subsidized to work (1 ( / ) 1i i i iR R
i
Rf S f S f− − ∂ ∂ > − ). This optimality condition can be rewritten as  
(15)        
2
3
2
2(1 ) ( / 2) (1 )H GW B N WS α αα α
+ + += −  
for the case of balanced depletion and 
(15′)        
2
3
2
2(1 ) (1 )Q W B WS α αα α
+ += −  
for the case of rapacious depletion, where the signs of the partial derivatives are found from total 
differentiation of (15) and (15′). It thus follows that the higher stake under balanced depletion warrants a 
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bigger wage subsidy to incite rebels to fight less than under rapacious depletion. The government incurs 
both the cost of fielding a bigger army and the cost of bribing rebels. Still, as the government’s grip on 
office and on natural resources has tightened, it may become more attractive for the government to switch 
from rapacious to balanced depletion.  
Proposition 6: It is optimal for the government to pay rebels to work and put down their arms. The wage 
subsidy should be higher the bigger the office rents. The wage subsidy should be higher under balanced 
than under rapacious depletion, especially if resource revenues are more substantial. As a result, rebels 
fight less, the government fields a bigger army than the rebels, and the government’s grip on office 
becomes stronger.  
Proof: See equations (13), (13′), (15) and (15′). 
The implications of bribes under private extraction can be conducted in a similar fashion. 
 
7. Discussion 
Our analysis has been highly stylized and in future work we may want to extend the results in the 
following directions. First, what happens if the government has no or limited access to capital markets 
and is unable to borrow with future resource revenue as collateral to finance an army and the weapons 
that it needs to fight off rebel coups? Private mining companies and the government then have a joint 
incentive to keep rebels out. Western governments and the World Bank are less likely to agree on giving 
dictators upfront money to fund an army, but Chinese firms seem not to have such qualms about this way 
of relaxing credit market constraints of host governments. Factors that relax these cash constraints thus 
bias the mode of exploration in the direction of balanced nationalized depletion or privatized extraction as 
this yields more funds upfront to bribe rebels, field a bigger army, or have more advanced weaponry. 
Private mining companies also have an interest in effective property rights and thus have an incentive to 
subsidize or find employment for rebels. It is of some interest to explore the possibility of making the 
strength of the rebel army endogenous and to incorporate looting and “booty futures” (e.g., if rebels gain 
access to cash this reduces relative fighting strength α). Rebels may sell future rights of natural resource 
exploitation to multinational firms before they have conquered the resources. This money may then be 
used to finance the start or continuation of a conflict (Ross, 2004). This channel of a binding budget 
constraint could also account for cash-strapped governments accepting bad oil deals from privatized 
companies rather than doing balanced nationalized extraction as this is the only way to finance the army. 
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,
Second, we have abstracted from private information and supposed perfect competition among mining 
companies when licenses are auctioned. In practice, mining companies may have private information 
about the in-situ stock of reserves, necessary investment outlays or costs of extraction that is not in their 
interest to share with the government. The government must then design an incentive-compatible contract 
under moral hazard (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). Such a contract will involve revenue sharing to 
provide sufficient incentives for the mining company to generate enough revenue for the government. In 
practice, there are many different negotiation challenges for getting an oil agreement (e.g., Radon, 2007) 
and various types of auctions may be appropriate under different circumstances (e.g., Cramton, 2007). 
Third, it may be important to allow for capital-intensive mining. Suppose that natural resource revenues 
are given by  where P( , )G N GN P I= Θ l N denotes the world price of natural resources and the amount 
of labour put into natural resource production. Production of natural resources is characterized by a 
neoclassical production function Θ(.) with constant returns to labour and capital. Wage income for the 
government faction is now given by 
Gl
(1 )G GW f− − l instead of (1 ).GW f− Due to the quasi-linear nature 
of preferences, fighting decisions are unaffected. The demand for labour in mining follows from setting 
the expected marginal revenue product of labour in natural resource production equal to the wage, 
 Demand for labour in the mining industry, ( , )
GN G
pP I WΘ =l l . ( )/ ,G NW pP I= ϒl with 
 and natural resource production thus increase with the 
probability of staying in office p = α/(α+1) and the world price of natural resources but decrease with the 
wage W. In our one-sector economy the real production wage in mining is constant, but in a Heckscher-
Ohlin model with a mining sector and a non-mining production sector it is not. In that case, if the mining 
sector is capital intensive, it follows that a higher price of natural resources pushes up the relative return 
on capital and pushes down the wage. Fighting intensities under rapacious depletion (3′) would then 
increase (as the opportunity cost of fighting becomes smaller). Under balanced Hotelling depletion, 
fighting intensities (3) would rise even more as not only the wage falls but also the revenues from natural 
resources and thus the stake rise. On the other hand, a higher price of labour-intensive natural resources 
pushes up wages and reduces the return on capital, so fighting becomes less interesting and work more 
attractive. The above discussion is inspired by Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2009), who develop a more fully 
worked-out theory of appropriation within the context of the well-known Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-
Viner models. In our setting we also allow for the direct effect of natural resources on conflict so that 
higher natural resource prices always lead to more conflict, but less so for labour-intensive modes of 
/ 1 / 0,N G GW pPϒ = Θ <l l /G G GI Iϒ = −Θ Θ >l l l 0,
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resource production such as for coffee, rice or bananas and more so for capital-intensive modes of 
resource production such as for oil or gas.  
 
8. Conclusions 
We offer a framework that makes both conflict behaviour and resource extraction endogenous and helps 
to make sense of the controversies and contradictions in the stylized facts. Thus, with a small number of 
exogenous parameters related to extraction technology and office rents, we are able to endogenously 
derive a multitude of predictions on conflict variables such as the equilibrium fighting efforts and 
armament, variables related to resource depletion like extraction method, extraction speed, investment 
levels and licence fees, and political outcomes like regime durability.  
We have analyzed endogenous armament, fighting, and choice of type of resource investment and 
extraction. Rapacious resource exploitation has economic costs, but we have shown that it can 
nevertheless be optimal due to lowered incentives for future rebel attacks. We have shown that private 
extraction is more attractive if the threat from rebels is not too large (i.e., with large office rents and a 
strong army), because fragile governments can only gain modest license fees. With private exploitation, 
rebels fight more than the government if they can renege on the contract with the mining company. It thus 
follows that government turnover must be higher under private extraction. We have also shown that both 
license fees and private mining investment are larger if property rights are better protected, i.e., if the 
government rents and army size are large.  
Furthermore, we have shown that governments invest more in the quality of their armies under balanced 
than under rapacious or privatized extraction. However, if the government can commit to weapon 
investments in case of private extraction, it can overcome the time inconsistency problem and will invest 
more in weapons, and will therefore increase its grip on office and receive a bigger fee from the mining 
company. In that case, investment in weaponry exceeds that under balanced and a fortiori under rapacious 
nationalized extraction. We have also shown that it is optimal for the government to bribe rebels to 
encourage them to work and put their arms down and that this wage subsidy is higher under balanced than 
rapacious depletion, especially if resource revenues are substantial. As a result, rebels fight less 
intensively, the government’s fields a bigger army, and the government’s grip on office is stronger. 
Some of these predictions can be tested with the help of the existing empirical evidence. For example, 
some of our results with respect to the determinants of fighting or with respect to factors favoring under-
investment can provide mechanisms to explain existing empirical results. In contrast, other propositions 
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require new empirical efforts. For example the expected effects of domestic political institutions and 
military capacity on the ownership structure and depletion speed of extraction companies, as well as on 
the share of rents captured by the government, is still empirical terra incognita. Similarly, our prediction 
of a “conditional resource curse”, making the conflict-inducing impact of natural resources depend on 
extraction method and speed as well as on military asymmetry, needs further empirical investigation. 
Further, our findings on the impact of speed and method of extraction on government turnover and army 
size suggest new topics for empirical testing. 
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Appendix: Description of data used in section 2 
Government Take: Percent of mining and petrol rents received by the government. Computations based 
on the data for US firms operating abroad. From the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2009). 
Military Expenditures as Share of GDP: From SIPRI (2009).  
Oil Production: In million tonnes. From British Petroleum (2009). 
Oil Reserves: Proved reserves in thousand million barrels. From British Petroleum (2009). 
State Ownership: Dummy for state ownership of oil extraction (S1 and S2). From Jones Luong and 
Weinthal (2010), where their coding is explained in detail. 
Years in Office: Years in office of the chief executive. From Beck et al. (2001, updated April 2008). 
